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Abstract 
One explanation for the increasing number of hectares with coca cultivation is that 
eradication strategies displace coca crops but fail to completely clear affected areas. In 
the drug policy literature, that dynamic shifting is commonly known as the balloon effect. 
This study integrates georeferenced agricultural data through spatially explicit 
econometric models to tests the hypothesis that forced eradication generates spillover 
effects. Using annual data for 1,116 contiguous municipalities in Colombia between 2001 
and 2010, we estimate a spatial Durbin model (SDM) with municipal and time fixed 
effects. At municipal level, we find no evidence of the balloon effect. Our results suggest 
that aerial eradication activities in a municipality reduce the new area under coca 
cultivation by 8 percent inside that municipality and by 3 percent in neighboring 
municipalities. Therefore, and contrary to the balloon effect hypothesis aerial eradication 
generates negative spillover effects. Our results provide deeper insights for policy design. 
In our analysis, we are able to distinguish between the change in coca cultivation as a 
result of eradication activities inside and outside the municipality. 
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As dozens of press headlines have announced, the War on Drugs has failed to curb 
cocaine production, consumption, and trafficking (Chalabi, 2016; Doward, 2016; Pardo 
Veiras, 2016). Therefore, presidents of the countries involved, public figures, and 
researchers have called for a new public policy approach to control drugs (LSE, 2014; 
Mulholland, 2016; Policy, 2011; Post, 2016). On the supply side, the failure has been 
attributed to the strategies used to control illicit crops, as coca crops shift from one area 
to another but do not disappear (Bertram, Blachman, Sharp, & Andreas, 1996; 
Nadelmann, 1989; Stares, 1996; Zepeda Martínez & Rosen, 2015). In the drug policy 
literature, this dynamic shifting is commonly known as the balloon effect. Cultivation is 
squeezed in one side; then it emerges in another. 
Even though balloon effect dynamics of coca cultivation are popular with the 
public and some researchers, its empirical testing has been limited (Basov, Miron, & 
Jacobson, 2001; Reuter, 2014; Reuter et al., 2009; Thoumi, 2003). Previous studies 
evaluating the effectiveness of the strategies used to control illicit crops (Ibañez & 
Carlsson, 2010; Mejía, Restrepo, & Rozo, 2015; Moreno-Sanchez, Kraybill, & 
Thompson, 2003; Reyes, 2014), and specifically testing the balloon effect (Raffo Lopez, 
Castro, & Diaz España, 2016; Rouse & Arce, 2006), did not account for the spatial 
dependence of coca cultivation and forced eradication. An increase in coca cultivation in 
one region can be caused by the reduction in forced eradication in its own region or by 
the increase in forced eradication in neighboring regions. As a result, the broad impacts—
including local and spillover effects—on coca crops may lead to biased policy 
conclusions if the spatial dependence of forced eradication is not factored in the analyses. 
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A recent study, acknowledging the spatial dynamics of coca crops, established a 
positive relationship between aerial fumigation in a municipality and coca cultivation in 
neighboring municipalities the following year (Rincón-Ruiz & Kallis, 2013). However, 
the analysis used an indicator of spatial correlation (Moran’s I) that suggests association 
but does not imply causation (Anselin, Sridharan, & Gholston, 2007). Hence, the 
spillover effect of the strategies used to control illicit crops on coca cultivation is still 
unknown. In contrast to previous research, this study implements a spatial econometric 
technique to address spatial dependence and estimates the spillover effects of forced 
eradication activities. 
To assess the spillover effects of the strategies used to control illicit crops, we use 
annual data for 1,116 contiguous municipalities in Colombia between 2001 and 2010. We 
estimate a spatial Durbin model (SDM) with municipal and time fixed effects. The results 
suggest that manual eradication does not affect new coca crops. Aerial eradication, in 
contrast, reduces new coca crops and generates negative spillover effects. Aerial 
eradication activities in a municipality reduce, on average, the new area under coca 
cultivation by 8 percent in that municipality and by 3 percent in neighboring 
municipalities. Thus, there is no balloon effect at municipal level. In addition, 
implementing aerial eradication inside natural parks generates great spillovers or indirect 
effects. The change in neighboring municipalities to the change in the municipality itself 
is in the proportion of 6.25 to 1. Therefore, neighboring municipalities bear much of the 
impact of this policy change. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section two describes the municipalities where 
coca cultivation takes place, explains the strategies used to control illicit crops in 
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Colombia, and performs a descriptive analysis to illustrate spatial clustering in the area of 
study. Section three describes data used in the econometric analysis, and section four 
explains the econometric methodology used. Section five presents the results of the 
spatial panel data model, and section six closes with a discussion of the results. 
 
2. Coca crops, forced eradication, and spatial dependence 
In Colombia, most coca cultivation takes place in remote areas of the country isolated by 
the Andes mountain range and the characteristic Amazon inclement weather. More than 
50 percent of the area affected by coca crops in Colombia lies in the Amazon region (see 
Table 1). Municipalities with coca cultivation are on average six times larger that those 
without coca crops. These municipalities are covered with thick rainforest and receive on 
average 50 percent more annual rainfall compared to municipalities without coca crops. 
The spatial aggregation of lowland forests is a concern since non-spatial econometric 
models treat each unit identically. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Forced eradication follows coca cultivation. Eradication activities take place in 
municipalities affected by coca crops, 440 municipalities out of 1,116 contiguous 
municipalities in Colombia as of 2010 (see Table 1). Forced eradication is implemented 
using manual eradication and aerial fumigation. Manual eradication is a labor-intensive 
activity to uproot coca bushes. This was the only method of eradication used inside 
natural parks and indigenous reserves before aerial eradication was permitted inside 
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natural parks in 2005 (Council, 2005) and indigenous reserves in 2007 (Council, 2007). 
Aerial eradication is accomplished by using airplanes to spray herbicide over coca 
plantations located in difficult-access areas with active armed conflict (Council, 1994; 
DNE, 2003). Aerial eradication with glyphosate was conducted in Colombia until 
September 2015 when it was suspended because of the health and environmental risks 
associated with the herbicide (ANLA, 2015). 
Analyzing the same geographic area using a local indicator of spatial association, 
there is a notable positive spatial clustering of coca crops in the Amazon region of 
Colombia in 2001.3 Figure 1 illustrates clusters of high-high hectares of coca. Hence, 
municipalities with high amounts of coca crops surround municipalities with high 
amounts of coca crops. By 2010, positive spatial clustering also appears in the Pacific and 
Northern region of the country. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Simultaneously, Figure 2 shows positive spatial clustering for aerial eradication in the 
Amazon region of Colombia in 2001. Eradication activities are concentrated in areas 
where coca cultivation is high. Therefore, there is also a positive spatial clustering for 
aerial eradication in the Pacific region in 2010. White areas in Figure 1 and 2 showed no 
statistically significant spatial clustering. 
 
 [Figure 2 about here] 
                                                 
3 Spatial weights for Figure 1 and 2 were created using a Queen contiguity method, first-order neighbors. 




This paper analyzes annual data for 1,116 contiguous municipalities in Colombia from 
2001 to 2010. The outcome variable used in the econometric analysis was calculated 
using the net area under coca cultivation at the cut-off date of the Annual Coca Survey 
(December 31). Annually, the Illicit Crops Monitoring Global Program of the United 
Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) captures satellite images that cover the 
entire continental Colombian territory (1,142,000 Km2). The accuracy identifying coca 
fields from the satellite images ranges between 87 and 90 percent (UNDCP, 2002; 
UNODC, 2003). Therefore, after the images are captured, the UNODC conducts field 
verification to calculate the extension of the area under coca cultivation with gaps or 
covered by clouds. The area identified in the images is also adjusted for aerial and 
manual eradication activities performed during the same period. The resultant area after 
the corrections for gaps and clouds and the adjustments for eradication activities is the net 
area under coca cultivation.4 
Equation 1 describes the dependent variable. 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 is the new area on coca crops in 
period 𝑡𝑡. 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 is the net area under coca cultivation at the cut-off date of the annual coca 
survey in period 𝑡𝑡, and 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡−1 is the net area under coca cultivation at the cut-off date of the 
annual coca survey in period 𝑡𝑡 − 1. This variable was reported in annual hectares.5 
 
Equation 1  Outcome variable used in the econometric analysis 
                                                 
4 Net area under coca cultivation refers to the area under coca cultivation net of eradication at the cut-off 
date of the annual coca survey, December 31. For more details about the collection process and 
methodology, visit: http://www.biesimci.org/SIMCI/metodologia.html 
5 One hectare is equivalent to 2.5 acres. 
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𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡 − 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡−1 
 
Data on the strategies used to control coca crops, manual and aerial eradication, 
come the Colombian Antinarcotics Police (DIRAN for its Spanish-language acronym). 
These variables were also reported in annual hectares. Alternative development is the 
number of families joining alternative development programs implemented in coca 
growing areas: Programa Proyectos Productivos (productive projects) and Programa 
Familias Guardabosques (forest ranger families). These data were collected by the 
Colombian Agency for Social Action and International Cooperation, currently known as 
the Departamento para la Prosperidad Social. 
In addition to the basic factors related to new coca crops, this analysis controls for 
policy implementation changes related to eradication activities affecting coca cultivation. 
The model estimated includes dummy variables capturing the difference between 
allowing aerial spraying inside natural parks and indigenous reservations. These dummies 
were coded zero before aerial eradication was implemented and one once it was 
implemented in municipalities with natural parks (after 2005) and indigenous 
reservations (after 2007). 
This analysis also controls for other municipal-level characteristics. Data on 
public spending, government financing sources, for instance: property tax, industry and 
commerce tax, gasoline tax, natural resources royalties, and cofinancing, come from the 
Colombian National Planning Department (DNP). They are reported annually in nominal 
thousand pesos. We use the CPI to adjust for inflation and per capita measures to make 
expenditures comparable over time and across municipalities. The DNP also ranks 
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municipalities based on their fiscal performance. DNP follows the IMF guidelines to 
generate a rank that ranges from zero to 100, in which values over 80 mean that the 
municipality is solvent and values below 40 that has low savings capacity, difficulties 
covering its operation expenses, and relies on national transfers (DNP, 2012). Finally to 
measure armed conflict, we use the number of victims of all kind of human rights 
violations perpetrated by different armed groups present in the area: guerrilla, 
paramilitary, or national army. Human rights violations occurred daily in each 
municipality, and the data were collected and reported by the Centre for Research and 
Popular Education/Peace Program. Table 2 provides a summary of the variables included 
in the spatial econometric analysis. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
4. Methods 
The estimation is carried out using two sequential steps: 
4.1 Spatial autocorrelation test 
To measure spatial autocorrelation, we calculated Moran’s I for the area under coca 
cultivation and the area fumigated with glyphosate using GeoDa (Anselin, Syabri, & 
Kho, 2006). The global Moran’s I is defined in Equation 2 (Moran, 1950): 
 
Equation 2  Global Moran’s I 
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Where 𝑛𝑛 denotes the number of municipalities, 1,116 for the national level assessment, 𝑥𝑥 
and ?̅?𝑥 denote the specific region and its mean, and 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the spatial weight matrix, 
representing the spatial relationship between region 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗. The spatial region in this 
study is contiguous, and the spatial weight matrix was generated using the Queen 
Contiguity method. 
We tested for spatial autocorrelation for new coca crops and aerial fumigation for 
each year from 2001 to 2010. Table 3 reports the results by year and scale of analysis. 
The global Moran’s I for new coca crops and area fumigated are significant for all years 
for the national level data. This result indicates that spatial autocorrelation persists across 
years, and positive values indicate spatial clustering. The spatial dependence in the 
dependent and key independent variable implies that previous analyses that did not 
account for clustering may be statistically biased if the source of spatial dependence 
relates to the variation in the strategies used to control illicit crops. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
4.2 Spatial econometric analysis 
To assess the spillover effects of forced eradication, we use a spatial panel data 
model (Elhorst, 2014b). The model includes a spatially lagged dependent variable and 
spatially lagged independent variables to specify spatial dependence among the 
observations (Anselin, Gallo, & Jayet, 2008; LeSage & Pace, 2009). Following the 
strategy described in LeSage and Pace (2009), Elhorst (2010), and Elhorst (2014a), we 
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start from a specific-to-general approach to select the model specification. First, we 
estimate a non-spatial model and test it against the spatial lag and spatial error model. 
Table 4 reports results for traditional and robust Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests (Anselin, 
1988; Anselin, Bera, Florax, & Yoon, 1996; Burridge, 1980). The hypothesis of no 
spatial lagged dependent variable and the hypothesis of no spatial auto-correlated error 
term are rejected in all model specifications. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
Then, we estimate a spatial Durbin model (SDM) as a general specification and 
test for alternative models. Equation 3 explains the formal structure of the SDM. 
 
Equation 3  Spatial Durbin model that contains a spatially lagged dependent variable 
and spatially lagged independent variables 
 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝜆𝜆∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜙𝜙 + 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽 + ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝜃𝜃 + 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  
where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the dependent variable for cross-sectional unit 𝑖𝑖 at period 𝑡𝑡. The variable 
∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖  is the interaction effect of the dependent variable 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 with the dependent 
variables 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 in the neighboring units, 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the 𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗th element of a prespecified 
nonnegative 𝑁𝑁 × 𝑁𝑁 spatial weights matrix 𝑊𝑊 describing the arrangement of the spatial 
units in the sample, 𝜙𝜙 is the constant term parameter, 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is a 1 × 𝐾𝐾 vector of exogenous 
variables, and 𝛽𝛽 is a matching 𝐾𝐾 × 1 vector of fixed but unknown parameters. To capture 
time-invariant municipal-specific characteristics that may confound the estimate of 
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interest, the model also includes municipal fixed effects, 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖, and to control for variables 
that are constant across municipalities but change over time, it has time-period specific 
effects, 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡. Finally, 𝜃𝜃 is a 𝐾𝐾 × 1 vector of parameters, and 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the stochastic error term. 
Using a general-to-specific approach, we estimate a spatial Durbin model to test 
whether it can be simplified to the spatial lag (SAR) or the spatial error model (SEM) 
(Burridge, 1981). Table 5 summarizes the results of the Hausman test to determine if the 
spatial panel model should include fix or random effects, and the Wald test for spatial 
model selection. The Hausman test favors fixed-effects estimations over random-effects 
estimations. The Wald test indicates that the hypothesis whether the spatial Durbin model 
can be simplified to the spatial lag model, 𝐻𝐻0:𝜃𝜃 = 0, must be rejected (243.52, p=0.000). 
In contrast to the previous result, the hypothesis that the spatial Durbin model can be 
simplified to the spatial error model, 𝐻𝐻0:𝜃𝜃 + 𝜆𝜆𝛽𝛽 = 0, cannot be rejected (17.37, 
p=0.183). These results imply that the SAR must be rejected in favor of the SDM, but the 
SEM is preferred over SDM. However, the SEM is a special case of a SDM for which 
𝜃𝜃 +  𝜆𝜆𝛽𝛽 = 0 (Appendix A), and a SEM is not suitable for a spillover effects analysis as 
the indirect effects are zero by construction (Elhorst, 2014b). Therefore, the SDM is the 
model specification that best describes the data. 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
5. Results 
To assess the spillover effects of forced eradication, we regress the size of new coca 
crops on the area manually eradicated and fumigated with glyphosate. Table 6, columns 
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(1) to (3), reports coefficients on three different spatial panel models. Column (1) 
presents results of a spatial autoregressive model (SAR). Column (2) shows estimates of 
a spatial error model (SEM), and column (3) reports coefficients of a spatial Durbin 
model (SDM). The three sets of results include spatial and time fixed effects regressors 
not shown. Numbers shown without parentheses are spatial panel coefficients. Numbers 
in parentheses are standard errors. 
Results are consistent throughout the three models. The spatial lag of the 
dependent variable, rho, is positive and significant in the SAR and the SDM. As a result, 
there are spatial effects, clustering of similar municipalities and similar reactions. A 
significant and positive spatial error term, lambda, has an equivalent interpretation for a 
SEM. Coefficients on aerial fumigation are also pretty consistent in the three models, 
negative and statistically significant. Specifically in the SDM, coefficients on spatially 
lagged explanatory variables, aerial fumigation, conflict, indigenous reserves, and 
gasoline tax, are significant.  
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
Table 7 reports direct, indirect, and total effects from the SDM estimation. The 
direct effect of an additional hectare of coca fumigated a year ago in municipality 𝑖𝑖 
reduces, on average, new coca crops by 0.08 hectares in municipality 𝑖𝑖. The direct effect 
of expenditures in human capital is also negative and significant. Increasing expenditures 
in human capital by one thousand pesos per inhabitant in municipality 𝑖𝑖 is associated with 
a reduction of 0.04 hectare of new coca crops in the same municipality. This result is 
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consistent with previous findings on the effects of social investment on new coca crops 
(Davalos, 2016). Armed conflict also has a direct effect on new coca crops. One 
additional victim of a human right violation per thousand inhabitants in municipality 𝑖𝑖 is 
associated with an increase of 0.84 hectares of new coca crops in municipality 𝑖𝑖, on 
average. This result supports previous findings establishing associations between coca 
cultivation and armed conflict (Angrist & Kugler, 2008; Camacho G. & López R., 2000; 
Carvajal Contreras & Sánchez Torres, 2002; Diaz & Sanchez, 2004; Holmes, Gutierrez 
de Pineres, & Curtin, 2006). There is no feedback effect. Coefficients on aerial 
eradication, conflict, and expenditures in human capital (SDM results in table 5) are very 
close to the direct effect of aerial eradication, conflict, and expenditures in human capital 
(Table 7). 
 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
The indirect effect of aerial eradication is negative and statistically significant. 
Therefore, if aerial eradication increases in municipality 𝑖𝑖 during year 𝑡𝑡, new coca crops 
decrease in municipality 𝑖𝑖 and its neighboring municipalities in year 𝑡𝑡 + 1. The change in 
neighboring municipalities to the change in the municipality itself is in the proportion of 
1 to -2.7. The indirect effect of spraying an additional hectare of coca in municipality 𝑖𝑖 on 
the new coca crops in neighboring municipalities is a reduction of 0.03 hectares. There 
are no indirect effects for expenditures on infrastructure or human capital. However, 
policy changes of implementing aerial eradication inside natural parks generate great 
spillovers or indirect effects. When aerial eradication was implemented inside natural 
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parks, new coca crops increase in the municipality with natural parks and its neighboring 
municipalities. The ratio of the change in neighboring municipalities to the change in the 
municipality itself is in the proportion of 6.25 to 1. Therefore, neighboring municipalities 
bear much of the impact of this policy change. 
Finally, the total effect of aerial eradication is the sum of its direct and indirect 
effect. If all municipalities increase aerial eradication by one hectare in period 𝑡𝑡, new 
coca crops will decrease by 12 percent in period 𝑡𝑡 + 1 in the typical municipality.6 This 
result is consistent with previous findings on the average effects of aerial eradication on 
coca cultivation (Acevedo, 2015; Davalos, 2016). Implementing aerial eradication inside 
natural parks also reports total effects. If all municipalities had natural parks and 
implemented aerial eradication inside them, new coca crops would increase, on average, 
by 49.8 hectares. There are no statistically significant total effects for expenditures on 
infrastructure or human capital. 
 
6. Conclusions 
The balloon effect has been repeatedly invoked to explain both the failures of the War on 
Drugs, and the geographic expansion of coca crops over time. Nevertheless, quantitative 
evidence for the balloon effect has been scarce, and either involves trends across 
countries (Dávalos, Bejarano, & Correa, 2009), or trends in spatial clusters (Rincón-Ruiz, 
Pascual, & Flantua, 2013). Our analyses reveal that aerial eradication activities in a 
municipality reduce the new area under coca cultivation by 8 percent inside that 
                                                 
6 One hectare is equivalent to 10,000 squared meters; thus, a reduction of 0.12 hectares equals a reduction 
of 1,200 squared meters or 12 percent of a hectare.  
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municipality and by 3 percent in neighboring municipalities. Therefore, and contrary to 
the balloon effect hypothesis, aerial eradication generates negative spillover effects. 
Thus, the balloon effect is not responsible for the failures of the 40-year-old War on 
Drugs. 
Although previous analyses had already identified a negative relationship between 
aerial eradication and coca cultivation (Acevedo, 2015; Davalos, 2016; Mejía et al., 
2015), our results provide deeper insights for policy design. In our analysis, we are able 
to distinguish between the change in coca cultivation as a result of eradication activities 
inside and outside the municipality. This distinction is important because an increase in 
coca cultivation in a municipality can be caused by the reduction in forced eradication 
inside that municipality or by the increase in forced eradication in neighboring 
municipalities. Based on our results, the broad impact of aerial eradication is a reduction 
of new coca crops inside and outside the municipality implementing that strategy. 
Previous literature hypothesized that forced eradication activities in some areas 
may increase coca cultivation in other areas (Raffo Lopez et al., 2016; Rouse & Arce, 
2006; Thoumi, 2003). Our spatial model tests that hypothesis at municipal level and 
provides evidence for the opposite relationship. A plausible explanation for negative 
spillover effects is that coca growers are aware of eradication activities in neighboring 
municipalities, and they fear that their coca crops may also be destroyed. Therefore, some 
of these growers reduce the area under coca cultivation, and others may decide not to 
grow coca at all. In summary, coca growers (offenders) are dissuaded from illegal 
activities when they acknowledge the negative consequences experienced by their 
neighbors (others) (Braga, Apel, & Welsh, 2013; Rincke & Traxler, 2011). 
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Until 2015, aerial eradication was the only credible threat to coca cultivation 
because out of many coca growers only few were prosecuted.7 Aerial eradication 
destroyed most of the coca crops sprayed with glyphosate; the average survival rate of 
coca crops sprayed during the period of study was 10.5 percent. Based on our results, 
aerial eradication discourages coca growers from increasing their area under coca 
cultivation inside the municipality and in neighboring municipalities as well. However, as 
September 2015, aerial eradication was suspended in Colombia and coca crops increased 
by 77,000 hectares from 2014 to 2016 (UNODC, 2017). 
As of 2018, manual eradication emerged as one of the main strategies to control 
illicit crops in Colombia (Semana, 2016). However, manual eradication is a labor-
intensive strategy that requires the work of 20 people during one day to eradicate just one 
hectare of coca (Mansfield, 2011). Manual eradication is an arduous and dangerous 
activity for those performing the task.8 In addition, based on our results, manual 
eradication has no impact on coca cultivation. Therefore, spending time and resources 
implementing a strategy that does not generate an impact on the area under coca 
cultivation is uncertain. 
  
                                                 
7 The Colombian police reported 855 felonies related with coca cultivation in 2009 (Colombia, 2010). Out 
of that total only 162 people were prosecuted for this crime. For the same period, it was estimated that 
about 300,000 people were involved in coca cultivation. 
8 According to Mansfield (2011): “In Peru, thirty eradication staff were killed in the Upper Huallaga Valley 
between 1986 and 1988. In the Macarena National Park in Colombia there were twenty-nine fatalities 
during a single day of eradication in December 2005 and a total of one hundred and eighteen were killed 
between 2005 and 2008. A further forty soldiers and police were killed during manual eradication efforts in 
Colombia in 2009.” 
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Figure 2- Local indicator of spatial association cluster map of aerial eradication per municipality, Colombia 2001 and 2010 
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Table 1-Municipalities, area, and precipitation, Colombia 2001-2010 




Without coca With coca Total Without coca Affected by coca crops Total Without coca With coca 
Amazon region 7 65 72 11,696 521,860 533,556 2,968 3,130 
Rest country 669 375 1,044 241,089 365,929 607,018 1,718 2,504 
Colombia 676 440 1,116 252,785 887,789 1,140,574 1,733 2,606 
Source: Compiled by the author based on the CEPAL (2013) report for the Amazon region classification, precipitation data from Worldclim 2005 from 
Armenteras, Cabrera, Rodríguez, and Retana (2013), and UNODC annual surveys for municipalities affected by coca cultivation from 2001 to 2010. The area 
affected by coca crops is the total area of the municipality that had coca cultivation, manual eradication, or aerial eradication at some point during the year. 
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Table 2- Summary of the variables considered in the analysis and data sources, Colombia 
          
Municipalities 
N=1,116 
Type Short name Units Description Source(s) Mean Std. 
       
Crops Coca (net of 
eradication) Hectare 
Area under coca cultivation at the cut-off date of 
the annual coca survey: December 31 
UNODC annual 
coca survey 73.88 418.60 
New area coca Hectare 
Annual change on the area under coca 











Number of hectares manually eradicated 
throughout the year in each municipality UNODC 34.18 347.74 
Fumigation Hectare Number of hectares fumigated throughout the year in each municipality 
DIRAN from 
UNODC 119.85 871.42 
Voluntary 
eradication Families 
Number of families that joined alternative 
development program implemented in coca 
growing areas 
Acción Social 12.03 118.05 
Control 
variables Conflict Number 
Victims of all kind of human rights violations 
per 1,000 inhabitants CINEP 0.53 14.39 
Infrastructure Constant 2008 COP 
Thousands pesos spent annually, per inhabitant, 
in each municipality on land, roads, buildings, 
and equipment 
DNP 245.84 344.47 
Human capital Constant 2008 COP 
Thousands pesos spent annually, per inhabitant, 
in each municipality on teacher salaries, 
training, school feeding programs, and 
education material 





Thousands pesos collected annually, per 
inhabitant, in each municipality from industry 
and commerce taxes DNP 
17.47 46.76 
Gasoline tax Constant 2008 COP 
Thousands pesos collected annually, per 




Non tax income Constant 2008 COP 
Thousands pesos received annually, per 
inhabitant, in each municipality from other 






Thousands pesos received annually, per 
inhabitant, in each municipality from natural 
resources DNP 
50.35 265.17 
Fiscal performance Rank from 0 to 100 
Municipal fiscal performance, where values 
over 80 mean that the municipality is solvent 
and values below 40 that has low savings 
capacity, difficulties to cover its operation 
expenses, and relies on national transfers 
DNP 59.52 8.96 
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics for 1,116 contiguous municipalities in Colombia during the period of study, from 2001 to 2010. 
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Table 3- Moran’s I value of new area coca and area fumigated 
Scale Municipal Level 
(1,116 municipalities) 
Year 
New area coca 
  
Area fumigated 
2001       0.255 *** 
2002 0.519 ***  0.332 *** 
2003 0.059 ***  0.284 *** 
2004 0.056 ***  0.334 *** 
2005 0.102 ***  0.262 *** 
2006 0.037 **  0.479 *** 
2007 0.133 ***  0.346 *** 
2008 0.218 ***  0.482 *** 
2009 0.183 ***  0.416 *** 
2010 0.238 ***   0.425 *** 
Note: ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
 
Table 4-Specific tests for spatial dependence, Lagrange Multiplier (LM) 





























LM spatial lag 62.33 0.00 58.25 0.00 50.43 0.00 45.41 0.00 
LM spatial error 48.99 0.00 44.98 0.00 39.77 0.00 35.31 0.00 
Robust LM 
spatial lag 28.35 0.00 29.09 0.00 24.38 0.00 23.75 0.00 
Robust LM 
spatial error 15.01 0.00 15.82 0.00 13.73 0.00 13.65 0.00 
 




Hausman test Ho: difference in coefficients not 
systematic 267.72 0 
Wald test Ho: SDM can be simplified to SAR 243.52 0 
Wald test Ho: SDM can be simplified to SEM 17.37 0.183 
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Table 6-Model comparison of the estimation results explaining new coca crops 
  New Area on Coca Crops 
  SAR SEM SDM 
Strategies to control illicit crops      
L1. Manual eradication 0.00 (0.01) 0.02* (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 
L1. Aerial fumigation  -0.07*** (0.01) -0.08*** (0.00) -0.08*** (0.01) 
L1. Alternative development 0.02 (0.03) 0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.03) 
       
Control variables       
Conflict 0.83*** (0.22) 1.00*** (0.18) 0.84*** (0.21) 
Natural parks 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
Indigenous reservations 28.22* (15.61) 12.04 (13.41) 34.22** (15.81) 
Expenditures infrastructure -0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) 
Expenditures human capital -0.04 (0.03) -0.02 (0.02) -0.04 (0.03) 
Industry and commerce tax -0.04 (0.16) -0.02 (0.13) -0.07 (0.16) 
Gasoline tax 1.10*** (0.40) 0.95*** (0.33) 1.11*** (0.39) 
Non tax income 0.07 (0.10) 0.06 (0.08) 0.06 (0.10) 
Natural resources royalties 0.03 (0.03) 0.02 (0.02) 0.03 (0.03) 
Fiscal performance -0.09 (0.53) -0.50 (0.45) -0.28 (0.53) 
       
W*L1. Manual eradication     -0.00 (0.00) 
W*L1. Aerial fumigation     0.03*** (0.00) 
W*L1. Alternative development    -0.01 (0.01) 
W*Conflict     -0.28*** (0.10) 
W*Natural parks     -5.66* (3.25) 
W*Indigenous reservations     -6.09 (5.22) 
W*Infrastructure     0.00 (0.01) 
W*Human capital     0.01 (0.01) 
W*Industry and commerce tax    -0.01 (0.06) 
W*Gasoline tax     -0.10 (0.15) 
W*Non tax income     0.01 (0.04) 
W*natural resources royalties    0.01 (0.01) 
W*Fiscal performance     0.32 (0.20)        
Rho 0.30*** (0.00)   0.30*** (0.00) 
Lambda   0.03*** (0.00)          
Observations 10,044 10,044 10,044 
Municipalities 1,116 1,116 1,116 
Notes: This table presents the results of the specification established in Eq. (3) by Spatial Durbin Model. The outcome 
variable used in this analysis is new area on coca crops. The estimates correspond to micro data set by municipality. 
The sample includes all Colombian contiguous municipalities from 2001 and 2010. Municipal and year fixed effects 
regressors not shown. L1 represents one-year lag. See Table 2 for description, units, and source for all the variables. * 
p<0.10 ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
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Table 7-Direct and indirect effects estimates based on the coefficients estimates of the 
spatial Durbin model reported in Table 6 
  Direct effect Indirect effect Total effect 
Strategies to control illicit crops 
L1. Manual eradication 0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.04) 0.02 (0.04) 
L1. Aerial fumigation -0.08*** (0.01) -0.03*** (0.01) -0.12*** (0.01) 
L1. Alternative development 0.03 (0.02) 0.02 (0.09) 0.05 (0.09) 
       
Control variables 
Conflict 0.84*** (0.21) 0.10 (0.98) 0.94 (1.03) 
Natural parks 6.80 (6.81) 42.98*** (16.27) 49.78** (21.29) 
Indigenous reservations 32.61* (17.95) -26.12 (42.13) 6.50 (41.66) 
Expenditures infrastructure -0.01 (0.02) 0.02 (0.05) 0.01 (0.05) 
Expenditures human capital -0.04* (0.02) -0.00 (0.08) -0.04 (0.08) 
Industry and commerce tax -0.07 (0.15) 0.22 -0.54 0.15 (0.53) 
Gasoline tax 0.80** (0.32) -1.17 (0.97) -0.37 (0.91) 
Non tax income 0.04 (0.09) -0.22 (0.29) -0.18 (0.32) 
Natural resources royalties 0.01 (0.03) -0.15 (0.10) -0.14 (0.10) 
Fiscal performance -0.36 (0.53) -1.53 (1.30) -1.89 (1.24) 
Notes: This table presents the results of the specification established in Eq. (3) by Spatial Durbin Model. The outcome 
variable used in this analysis is new area on coca crops. The estimates correspond to micro data set by municipality. 
The sample includes all Colombian contiguous municipalities from 2001 and 2010. Municipal and year fixed effects 
regressors not shown. L1 represents one-year lag. See Table 2 for description, units, and source for all the variables. 
*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. 
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Appendix A. Spatial error model (SEM) is a special case of a Spatial Durbin Model 
(SDM) 
 




𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜙𝜙 + 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽 + �𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝜃𝜃 + 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
 




𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜙𝜙 + 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽 − 𝜆𝜆𝛽𝛽�𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
 






𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡� + 𝜙𝜙 + 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽 + 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝜆𝜆 � 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑁𝑁
𝑖𝑖=1





�𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡� + 𝜙𝜙 + 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽 + 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
 
⇒ SEM 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 =  𝜙𝜙 + 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝛽𝛽 + 𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
 
where 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝜆𝜆∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
 
